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ABSTRACT 
  This paper focuses on the effects of nonbinding recommendations on bargaining 
outcomes.  Recommendations are theorized to have two effects:  they can create a focal point for 
final bargaining positions, and they can decrease outcome uncertainty should dispute persist.  
While the focal point effect may help lower dispute rates, the uncertainty reduction effect is 
predicted to do the opposite for risk-averse bargainers.  Which of these effects dominates is of 
critical importance in the optimal design of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, 
which are becoming increasingly utilized to help resolve disputes in a variety of settings.  We 
theoretically examine the effects of recommendations on the bargaining contract zone.  Our 
theoretical framework, which allows bargainers’ final positions to influence a binding outcome 
should negotiations fail, provides for a more stringent test of focal points than previously 
considered.  We also present data from controlled laboratory bargaining experiments that are 
consistent with our model of recommendation effects.  Recommendations are empirically shown 
to influence final bargaining positions and negotiated settlement values.  Furthermore, dispute 
rates are significantly lower when one includes recommendations, even where the 
recommendation is completely ignored in final-stage arbitration.  This highlights a potentially 
significant role for the use of nonbinding procedures, such as mediation, as a preliminary stage in 
developing more efficient ADR procedures. 
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1.  Introduction 
A significant institutional trend of the last 20-30 years has been the increased emphasis 
on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs, such as arbitration and mediation, to help 
resolve disputes.  ADR programs currently operate in a wide variety of contexts that include, 
among others, union-management negotiations, commercial contract disputes, divorce 
negotiations, college campus conflict, and civil/community (neighborhood) disputes.  
Community mediation programs are estimated to have almost 20,000 active volunteer 
community mediators nationwide in programs that now receive over 97,000 annual case 
referrals.
1  Though only available in about 15% of colleges, campus mediation programs 
experienced a ten-fold increase during the 1990s (from around 20 to over 200).
2  Tort reform in 
several states has included implementing court-annexed ADR procedures prior to litigation in 
order to relieve pressure on the backlogged litigation system.  Also, the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Services (FMCS)—an independent government agency created to promote labor-
management peace—has an annual mediation intake of nearly 40,000 cases and receives nearly 
20,000 annual arbitration panel requests.
3   
In short, the volume of its use now makes ADR a significant institution in the U.S., not to 
mention elsewhere, and the trend towards increased ADR use appears persistent.  Any 
improvements in ADR institutional design would significantly reduce dispute costs in the U.S. 
and promote improved bargaining relationships, which are likely to further reduce future dispute 
                                                 
1 Statistics are from the National Association for Community Mediation (NAFCM), and are available at the NAFCM 
website at www.nafcm.org.  
2 Data reported can be found on www.campus-adr.org, funded in part by a grant from the federal Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE). 
3 Data available in the annual reports available on the FMCS website at www.fmcs.org.   3 
rates.  An examination of the key characteristics of different ADR procedures is necessary in 
order to design the most effective dispute settlement institutions. 
An ADR procedure can be generally classified as binding (e.g., litigation or arbitration) 
or nonbinding (e.g., mediation).  Binding procedures guarantee a settlement, but nonbinding 
procedures allow the bargainers to retain more control over the settlement, which increases 
bargainer satisfaction with the outcome.  Some procedures are formal or informal hybrids where 
a nonbinding procedure is utilized initially, and then a binding procedure follows if needed.  This 
is the case, for example, with court-annexed ADR that might compel the use of mediation prior 
to litigation.
4  There is a general consensus that bargainers typically prefer mediation to binding 
arbitration or litigation, but it is unclear whether settlement rates are uniformly higher under 
mediation.  In naturally occurring bargaining data, only the most serious disputes are handled 
with a binding procedure.  The resultant sample selection implies that a simple examination of 
settlement rates from field data across various ADR procedures cannot identify the most 
effective ADR procedure for settling comparable disputes.  Further, because it is often difficult 
to quantify the factors that make one dispute more serious than another, econometric tools 
designed to address sample selection are at a disadvantage.   
This paper focuses on the use of nonbinding recommendations to improve binding 
dispute settlement procedures (e.g. arbitration, litigation, or legislation).  Specifically, we ask 
whether recommendations can improve settlement rates and bargaining outcomes.  A nonbinding 
recommendation has two potential effects on bargainers.  First, a recommendation may serve as a 
                                                 
4 For example, Wisconsin arbitrators for public sector labor disputes first mediate the cases, and they only use 
arbitration in the event that mediation fails (see Babcock and Taylor, 1996).  Also, Hebdon (2001) notes that New 
York state public policy allows certain disputes to utilize a formal fact-finder recommendation, which is nonbinding, 
prior to implementation of a legislated (binding) settlement.  As another example, many counties in Utah and North 
Carolina now require that divorce and custody cases be mediated before they proceed to trial.  4 
focal point, thereby improving the chance of voluntary settlement.  On the other hand, a 
recommendation may reduce the uncertainty surrounding the likely outcome from litigation or 
arbitration.  In this case recommendations may actually increase dispute rates for risk-averse 
bargainers who prefer settlement versus the uncertain lottery of arbitration (see Farber and Katz, 
1979).  Which of these two effects dominates is of critical importance in evaluating whether 
nonbinding ADR can improve the effectiveness of litigation or arbitration.  Additionally, we 
consider whether bargaining positions are affected by the inclusion of recommendations, because 
final bargaining positions may affect the outcomes determined by arbitration, litigation, or 
legislation.  We examine these issues theoretically, and we also present data from controlled 
laboratory bargaining experiments that generally support the hypothesized beneficial effects of 
recommendations:  lower dispute rates and convergent final offers.  Lower dispute rates reduce 
the need to invoke a binding settlement procedure, and convergent final offers lead to less 
variable (i.e., more acceptable) outcomes in the event that binding ADR is needed. 
A separate strand of experimental economics research is starting to identify the 
potentially important role of “advice” from other players in affecting behavior and improving 
outcome efficiency (e.g., Schotter, 2003:  Schotter and Sopher, 2002).  These emerging studies 
of intergenerational games are innovative but quite distinct from our interests.  The 
recommendations that we consider are not passed down from a previous generation of players, 
and our recommenders do not have a financial incentive in the bargainers’ outcomes—in fact, 
we mechanize the implementation of recommendations as random draws from a settlement 
distribution.  The recommendations we examine therefore come from a disinterested third-party, 
which is modeled after neutral ADR agents who have no authority to issue binding settlements.  5 
The potential benefits from a systematic use of recommendations in ADR procedures are 
significant given the ease with which any binding settlement procedure could be amended to 
allow for a preliminary nonbinding recommendation.  In other words, we do not narrow our 
focus to testing one or two new ADR procedures, as has been done in previous research.  Rather, 
our focus is on the use of recommendations that could be integrated more system-wide across a 
large variety of existing binding settlement procedures.  If such nonbinding recommendations 
can increase voluntary settlement rates—generally considered a measure of ADR success—this 
could help minimize the costly use of litigation, binding arbitration, and legislatures in 
determining settlements.  To the extent that voluntary settlements are considered more efficient 
than mandated settlements (see Crawford, 1979), this would also improve the efficiency of 
bargaining outcomes in many contexts.   
 
2. Theoretical  Framework 
  The model is an extension of Farber and Katz (1979) that incorporates a fact finder and 
also utilizes a “sophisticated” arbitrator similar to that used by Farber (1981).  Consider two 
bargainers B and S engaged in zero-sum bargaining over one dollar (or any fixed amount of 
money).  For simplicity, we will often refer to bargainer B (S) as the buyer (seller).  Bargainer 
utility depends on risk preferences, c, and the fraction of the “pie” received: 
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where y is the amount player S receives, and z=1-y is the amount that player B receives.  Utility 
increases in the fraction of the pie received, with U(0)=0 and U(1)=1.  Risk preferences are  6 
defined solely by -ci for i=b,s, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (see Farber and 
Katz, 1979).  As such, player i is risk-averse (loving) when ci < (>) 0.     
   Bargaining impasse is ultimately settled by a binding decision-maker we refer to as the 
arbitrator.  Bargainers are uncertain about the exact settlement preferences, D, of the arbitrator, 
and this uncertainty is modeled by assuming that bargainers know the distribution function from 
which preferred settlements are drawn.  Let yiF and σi
2, for i=b,s, be the bargainer’s expectation 
of the mean and variance of the arbitrator’s preference over the amount the seller receives.  
Farber and Katz (1979) examine the bargaining contract zone—the region of settlements both 
bargainers prefer, ex ante, over arbitration—assuming that the settlement is a random draw, D, 
from the distribution of the arbitrator’s preferred settlements.   
  Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) show that a non-binding recommendation reduces the 
size of this contract zone both before and after the recommendation is given, under what they 
call “naïve” arbitration.  Under naïve arbitration, the arbitrator does not place any weight on the 
bargainers’ final offers in crafting a binding settlement.  This is rather unrealistic, and the present 
paper considers a more realistic “sophisticated” arbitrator, whose decision rule is as follows.  
Suppose that a nonbinding recommendation, R, is given to the bargainers at some intermediate 
point prior to declaration of impasse.  The recommendation (or suggestion) is nonbinding, but 
bargainers are aware that the arbitrator places a weight, γ ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ , on the recommendation relative 
to his own settlement preference when crafting the binding settlement.  In addition, the 
sophisticated arbitrator weights the midpoint of the bargainers’ final offers, xb and xs, in making 
his settlement choice, ys.  Specifically, final settlement given to the seller is now 
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where 
S
x x b s −
= δ ,  and S is the size of the total bargaining range.  This function for δ captures 
the intuition of Farber (1981) in that the arbitrator places increasingly more weight on the 
bargainers’ final offers the more they converge (as δ approaches zero, the weight on the final 
offers approaches one).  Alternatively, the farther apart are the final offers—in this case δ 
approaches 1—the more the arbitrator ignores the final offers.  The idea is that bargainers who 
are “close” to agreement ought to have a settlement that reflects their stated preferences (offers), 
while offers that diverge suggest that settlement is unlikely and final offers are less informative, 
which gives the arbitrator more leeway in imposing his own settlement preference. 
This formulation allows us to consider cases where the recommendation is completely 
ignored (γ=0), as well as cases where the arbitrator simply adopts the recommendation as the 
settlement (γ=1). This latter case is less interesting given that γ=1 implies that all uncertainty is 
resolved once a recommendation is made.  Henceforth, we maintain the assumption that γ<1.  As 
long as some positive weight is placed on the recommendation (i.e., 0 < γ < 1), then the 
uncertainty surrounding an arbitrated settlement is reduced.  If uncertainty is important to 
encourage risk-averse bargainers to settle, then it follows that a recommendation may be 
counterproductive for voluntary settlement.  On the other hand, if the recommendation serves as 
a focal point, then it may improve settlement rates even though it reduces outcome uncertainty.   
  The boundaries of the contract zone are defined by the certainty equivalent of each 
bargainer, or the minimum (maximum) amount that the seller (buyer) would be willing to accept 
(pay) to avoid the uncertainty of proceeding to arbitration.  The literature refers to certainty 
equivalents alternatively as reservation values or threat points of the bargainers, and our 
theoretical framework assumes that final threat points (i.e., final offers) can be affected by  8 
recommendations.  We show in the appendix that the contract zone, ∆, of mutually acceptable 
settlement outcomes is given by  
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This reduces to the Farber and Katz (1979) contract zone for the case where δ=1 (the arbitrator 
ignores final offers) and γ=0 (the arbitrator ignores – or is unaware of – the recommendation).   
3  Focal Point Effects of Recommendations 
We formalize the focal point hypothesis by assuming that bargainers’ final offers are 
their initial threat points modified by the recommendation.  Specifically, assume that  
   xb=αR+(1-α) b x ˆ  and xs=βR+(1-β) s x ˆ               (3) 
where  b x ˆ  and  s x ˆ  are the buyer’s and seller’s, respectively, exogenously given initial threat 
points, which represent their prior preferences regarding a settlement.
5  In the extreme case, one 
might think of  b x ˆ  as the minimum value of the bargaining range (the buyer prefers to pay as 
little as possible), and  s x ˆ  as the maximum value of the bargaining range (the seller prefers to 
receive as much as possible), though  s x ˆ  and  b x ˆ  may be more moderate.  If R serves as a focal 
point then α,β>0.  It is possible to assume α and β are functions of the recommendation, but for 
now we maintain the assumption that they are exogenously given, and represent the degree to 
which the recommendation influences the final offers.  Also assume for simplicity that 
bargainers have common beliefs about the arbitrator’s settlement preferences, ybF=ysF.  In this 
case, substituting (3) into (2), and taking into account that 
S
x x b s −
= δ , we have 
                                                 
5 One might also assume a nonlinear specification for the equations in (3), but this unduly complicates the analysis.  9 
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Assuming that bargainers are, on average risk averse, the first term in (4) is positive.
6  This first 
term is just the Farber and Katz (1979) contract zone, which shows the contract zone increasing 
in the risk aversion of the bargainers. 
  The second and third terms in (4) capture the effects of the focal point and the 
sophisticated arbitrator on the contract zone.  The second term is due to the arbitrator weighting 
the recommendation by  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ γ , with higher weights shrinking the contract zone, ceteris 
paribus.  The last term in (4), call it T, is due to the sophisticated arbitrator and is where focal 
points indirectly affect the contract zone.  The size of the contract zone is increasing in T.  As 
long as the numerator of this term is less than S, the total size of the bargaining range, then the 
term T shrinks the contract zone.  More convergent final offers will therefore shrink the contract 
zone via the sophisticated arbitrator, and more convergent offers may occur for two reasons.  
First, the preferences of the bargainers may be more moderate than they need be ( s x ˆ < max or 
b x ˆ > min values of the bargaining range).  Assuming no focal points (α=β=0), then 
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.  Secondly, the recommendation will moderate the 
bargainers’ final positions if α=β>0, but the location of the recommendation does not affect the 
size of the contract zone.  To see this, rearrange and rewrite 
                                                 
6We consider joint risk aversion a reasonable assumption in general. This assumption is supported by data in Holt 
and Laury (2002), who find that experimental subjects responding to non-hypothetical lottery questions are typically 
risk averse, even over “normal” laboratory payoffs.  The assumption of risk aversion also seems realistic in 
application to real-world negotiations.  Though risk preferences were not measured for our subjects, Dickinson 
(2005) reports results from experiments using the same general student subject pool, and he finds both Players A and  10 
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clear that the location of R does not affect the contract zone, because then  0
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more the recommendation serves as a focal point to either bargainer, then the more it indirectly 
shrinks the contract zone via the sophisticated arbitrator. 
  It is also worth noting in (4) that both the size and location of the contract zone may be 
influenced by the recommendation.  Because of the way that bargainer preferences are 
formulated, if recommendations are focal (i.e. α,β>0), then a large recommendation increases 
final offers.  This will raise the arbitrator’s final settlement, since the midpoint between final 
offers (which is something the sophisticated arbitrator considers) is now larger, making bargainer 
certainty equivalents higher (see appendix).  That is, holding the distance between final offers 
constant, higher recommendations shift the contract zone to the right.
7   
  The effect of the recommendation on the size of the contract zone is less clear when α≠β.  
For example, suppose that α=0 but β>0.  In this case, an extreme high recommendation, R> s x ˆ , 
                                                                                                                                                             
B (in a related bargaining experiment) to be slightly risk averse, with cb= -.23 and cs= -.12).  Many of the results 
would be reversed if bargainers are risk-loving, but the laboratory data do not support a risk-loving hypothesis. 
7 It should be noted that if the recommendation has a larger influence on the seller than on the buyer (i.e. if β > α), 
then a high recommendation increases the seller’s final offer by more than the buyer’s.  In this case, the weight the 
arbitrator puts on the midpoint between final offers actually shrinks, and the effect of uncertainty and risk aversion 
on certainty equivalents grows.  Because of these offsetting effects of possibly lower weight from the arbitrator, it is 
not possible to say that certainty equivalents are always increasing in R, even when final offers are.  11 
will actually increase the size of the contract zone, as it would make the seller’s final offer 
( s s x R x ˆ ) 1 ( β β − + = ) larger but have no effect on the buyer’s final offer.  The opposite will be 
true with an extreme low recommendations, R <  b x ˆ , when α>β=0.  This perverse effect of 
extreme recommendations can result if bargainer weights are specified more generally as 
α=α(R), or β=β(R), with  ] 1 , 0 [ , ∈ β α  and α’<0, β’>0.  This would reflect a self-serving bias in 
how bargainers view a suggestion, which may a desirable way to model focal points given the 
empirical support found for the self-serving bias in negotiations (see Babcock and Loewenstein, 
1997).
8  Though this is an intriguing theoretical possibility, our data do not support this 
hypothesis of a self-serving bias in focal point effects.
9   
  To summarize, Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) highlight the two main effects that 
recommendations may have on bargaining.  The first of these—the uncertainty effect of Farber 
and Katz (1979)—states that the reduction of outcome uncertainty that a suggestion brings will 
decrease ∆ and make dispute more likely.
10  Existing laboratory research confirms that reduced 
outcome uncertainty increases dispute rates (Ashenfelter et al., 1992; Babcock and Taylor, 
1996).  The focal point effect (see Schelling, 1957) suggests that, irrespective of the size of the 
contract zone, any recommendation is salient and should help coordinate negotiations and reduce 
                                                 
8 An extreme suggestion typically increases the size of the contract zone when its effect on the party for whom it is 
favorable is larger than its effect on the other party.  That is, an extremely high suggestion will mostly enlarge the 
contract zone if its effect on the seller (given by β) is larger than its effect on the buyer (given by α).   
9 Specifically, neither extreme nor moderate suggestions are shown to increase the divergence between the seller and 
buyer final bargaining positions, which is what one would predict if bargainers have self-serving α,β weights as 
described above.  This can be seen also in Figure 1, to be discussed in the Results section.  The data also do not 
support the opposite case where less self-serving suggestions are more heavily weighted—one might argue this if 
focal point weights are affected by a type of Bayesian updating. 
10 This is a formal statement of how recommendations can actually damage prospects for voluntary settlement, as 
has been suggested “….., in order to preserve the uncertainty surrounding the arbitration process and to encourage 
real bargaining, allowing the arbitrator to act as a mediator and other mechanisms that provide flows of information 
from the arbitrator to the parties will be counterproductive.”  Farber and Katz (1979), p. 63 (emphasis added).  12 
dispute rates.  The net effect of recommendations on bargaining outcomes is ultimately an 
empirical question.
11   
  In our framework, the focal point effect of a recommendation can not only directly 
reduce certainty by revealing a portion of the likely settlement outcome (γ>0), but it also 
indirectly reduces uncertainty via the sophisticated arbitrator (i.e., by increasing the weight 
placed on the final bargaining positions).  As a result, our framework provides a conservative test 
of the potential for recommendations to reduce dispute rates.  The initial results in Dickinson and 
Hunnicutt (2005) indicate that the focal point effect likely dominates the uncertainty effect.  
However, many questions remained unanswered.  Specifically, our theoretical approach to 
modeling final offers as a function of the recommendation generates additional hypotheses that 
are testable from the experimental data.  Our previous work did not generate final offer data, 
which limited a previous exploration of final bargaining position effects.  Also, the current 
experiments include a treatment (below) with a zero-weighted recommendation (i.e., γ=0).  This 
provides a cleaner test of the degree to which inclusion of a suggestion can improve settlement 
rates, independent of the degree to which the suggestion is weighted at final impasse.     
 
 
4.  Experimental Environment 
                                                 
11 The existing literature is not in complete agreement over the effect of uncertainty and contract zone size on 
dispute rates.  While some argue that larger contract zones imply lower dispute rates (e.g., Crawford, 1982; Farber 
and Bazerman, 1987), others argue that larger contract zone imply that there is more over which to dispute, thereby 
increasing dispute rates (e.g., Tracy, 1986, 1987; Crampton, 1992).  Our position is that if the uncertainty effect 
holds, lower dispute rates should follow from larger contract zones, ceteris paribus, which is consistent with results 
in Ashenfelter et al, 1992.  If the focal point effect is important, dispute rates may fall independent of the size of the 
contract zone.    13 
We generate data from a controlled laboratory bargaining environment to empirically 
examine the effects of focal points and outcome uncertainty.  The experiment uses a computer 
interface to randomly and anonymously match subjects—disputant B (the buyer) and disputant S 
(the seller)—with the same anonymous counterpart for twenty 3-minute rounds, with subjects 
bargaining over the value of a variable, x.
12  Payoff information is private, but subjects are aware 
that counterpart earnings move opposite own-earnings.  Thus, subjects are aware that their own 
gain is their counterpart’s loss, and private payoff level information simulates the real world 
asymmetry that exists in assessing the value your bargaining counterpart places on the object of 
negotiations.  Given this, our environment is one in which the exact size of the contract zone is 
uncertain.
13  The disputants bargain in each round over a $2.00 pie, which (unknown to the 
disputants) would be equally split at x=500.  Dollar payoffs for disputant B are decreasing in x 
and given by PB(x)=1.00+.005*(500-x).  For disputant S, payoffs are increasing in x and given 
by PS(x)=1.00+.005*(x-500).  This private payoff information is presented to the subjects by 
means of payoff tables. 
 The experiment does not allow communication other than the numeric messages 
transmitted through the subjects’ computer terminals.  The bargaining environment is relatively 
unstructured.  Offers can be exchanged freely, and there is no requirement that offers must 
“improve” upon previous offers, or that there be counteroffers, or that there be any offer at all.  
                                                 
12The experimental environment is motivated by the design of Ashenfelter et al (1992), and is an extension of the 
bargaining-with-arbitration application used in Dickinson (2004). 
13 Additionally, subjects may not make offers outside of their bargaining range.  Disputant A is instructed to bargain 
for x between 200 and 700, and disputant B for x between 300 and 800.  The theoretical predictions are silent as to 
the effects of this detail, but it is meant to improve the validity of the data since real-world bargainers would likely 
not have full information on their counterpart’s target range.  Further, asymmetric ranges should help avoid the 50-
50 split focal point (an issue mentioned in Ashenfelter et al., 1992, though they deal with it in a different way).  14 
The most recent offer of either disputant is displayed at the top of the offer queue, and either 
disputant can accept his/her counterpart’s standing offer at any time.   
Subjects proceed at their own pace through on-screen instructions that explain in detail 
all aspects of the experimental bargaining environment.  Sample bargaining screens are 
displayed to the subjects in the general instructions to highlight important details (instructions 
available at http://www.appstate.edu/~dickinsondl/instructions.html).  Across all experiment 
groups we utilized eight different dispute resolution treatments:  NA, NAsugg, CAnaive, 
CAsoph, CAsugg(0), CAsugg(.20), CAsugg(.50), and CAsugg(.80).  Each particular 
experimental group participates in four distinct treatments (five rounds of each) over the course 
of a 20-round experiment.
14  In the NA (No Arbitration) treatment subjects are allowed to 
bargain for the entire 3-minute round, and should they reach the end of the round without 
agreeing on the value of x, payoffs to both bargainers are zero.  NAsugg is similar except that a 
nonbinding suggestion is given at 1.5 minutes into the round.  CAnaive and CAsoph are 
conventional arbitration (CA) treatments that do not provide a suggestion, but rather let subjects 
bargain for the entire 3 minutes prior to implementing a settlement.  This settlement is a draw 
from a N(500,60) distribution of potential arbitrator settlements.  Subjects receive prior 
information on the computer “decision-maker” by viewing a table of 100 previous draws from 
the distribution in the instructions (see Ashenfelter et al, 1992, for the use and justification of this 
form of mechanizing the arbitrator for experimental purposes), along with viewing the density 
                                                 
14Subjects were unaware that 5 rounds of each treatment would be completed, which helps control for strategic play 
across multiple rounds.  Also the specific ordering of the treatments varied for different bargaining pairs (although 
each treatment consisted of five consecutive rounds) - this was to control for potential ordering effects.  15 
function and being given information on central tendencies from the distribution.
15  The CAnaive 
arbitrator implements a random draw from the arbitrator distribution as the binding settlement, 
whereas the CAsoph treatment weights the bargainers’ final offers as per equation (1), though 
without a suggestion (i.e., γ=0).   
The various CAsugg treatments implement settlements based on (1) (with  0 ≥ γ ), and the 
number in parenthesis refers to the gamma-weighting of the suggestion.  In these treatments, a 
suggestion was given at 1.5 minutes.  In all treatments that give a suggestion, suggestions were 
given as draws from the same N(500,60) distribution as for the arbitrator, and subjects were 
given the same information on the computer “suggestor” distribution as they were given for the 
computer arbitrator.  The use of the exact same distribution for both the suggestion and arbitrator 
settlement-preference distributions is externally valid in the sense that arbitrators, mediators, and 
fact-finders, often come from the same pool of neutral dispute resolution agents in the field.  In 
all treatments subjects were allowed to submit final offers at impasse, and the binding settlement 
was only implemented if final offers were still in disagreement (i.e., xb < xs).  
In utilizing an anonymous, no-communication experiment, we trade off some external 
validity for a higher level of internal control in our experiments.  This approach is meant to 
address the main weakness of field data on negotiations and dispute settlement—the lack of 
comparability of data across dispute resolution conditions.  While the external validity of 
laboratory bargaining data may be a concern, there is precedence in the literature supporting the 
usefulness of experiments when subjects are economically motivated, as ours are (see Bolton and 
Katok, 1998; Roth et al., 1988).  Finally, we must address certain data issues given that our 
                                                 
15 This information given over-and-beyond the table of 100 previous draws was implemented to minimize optimism 
about likely outcomes from the experimental arbitrator (see Dickinson and Hunnicutt, 2005).       16 
subjects are matched as bargaining counterparts for the entire 20-round experiment.  As a result, 
the econometric analysis of the data controls for potentially interdependent error terms for a 
given subject-pair across rounds, and it also controls for the bargaining history of the subject-pair 
to address the concern of subject-learning. 
5.  Results 
We report results from 77 bargaining pairs, each completing a 20-round experiment.  
Subjects earned, on average, $20 for participation in the 1.5 hour experiment.  The main results 
are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, which analyze the determinants of dispute rates, final 
bargaining positions, and settlement outcomes.  Though the computer application did not allow 
submission of offers outside one’s suggested bargaining range, it did allow a bargainer to agree 
to an offer outside of the bargaining range.  As such, a small number of observations are omitted 
from the analysis (40 out of 1540), leaving us with 1500 total rounds of bargaining data. 
5.1  Dispute Rates 
Dispute rates are often considered the most important factor in evaluating the 
effectiveness of an ADR procedure.  Table 1 shows the results from a binomial probit model of 
dispute rates (dispute=1, 0 otherwise).  Here, we code dispute=1 when the bargaining pair 
utilizes the dispute resolution mechanism in a given round.  If the pair is at impasse at the end of 
the round, but their final offers converge (or criss-cross, such that xb>xs), then this is coded as a 
voluntary settlement (i.e., dispute=0).  The model estimates treatment effects of the various 
dispute resolution procedures, as well as the effects of two bargaining experience variables, 
Round and Dispute History.  The variable Round=1-20 measures the effect of the bargaining 
round, to control for learning or experience within the experiment.  Dispute History=1-19, which 
is the cumulative previous number of disputes in which the bargainer pair has engaged, accounts  17 
for pair-specific bargaining history in the experiment.  We report the estimated marginal effects 
in Table 1, and the covariance matrix is adjusted for data clustering by bargaining pair.  The 
model correctly predicts 77% of the dispute outcomes. 
In reviewing the treatment variable marginal effects it is clear that the use of arbitration 
significantly increases the likelihood of dispute relative to the NA treatments (the omitted 
treatment variable category is NA.  This is not surprising giving that arbitration reduces the 
direct monetary cost of dispute.  Relative to the naïve arbitrator treatment (CAnaive), CAsoph 
increases the likelihood of dispute by a statistically insignificant amount (Wald test of the two 
coefficients, p=.47), though in the direction predicted by our theoretical analysis of contract zone 
size—contract zones are smaller with the sophisticated arbitrator, which should imply higher 
dispute rates.  In comparing the suggestion treatments, the pattern of the estimated marginal 
effects indicates a peak in the marginal increase in dispute rate probability at CAsugg(.50).  The 
coefficient on CAsugg(.50) is significantly larger than the coefficient on CAsugg(0) (p=.06 for 
the Wald test) and the coefficient on the other extreme, CAsugg(.80) (p=.01).
16  
In comparing arbitration with a recommendation versus without, recall that CAsugg(0) is 
identical to CAsoph, except that CAsugg(0) includes a midround suggestion.  Furthermore, in 
CAsugg(0) the recommendation is completely ignored in arbitration, and so there is no direct 
                                                 
16 Interestingly enough, this pattern of coefficients indicates that, relative to NA, the effect of CAsugg as a function 
of, γ, is an inverted U-shape.  In other words, the highest dispute rates are predicted when γ=.50, and the lowest 
when γ=0 and γ=1.00−−this is close to the γ=.80 treatment we implement.  Though these predictions are not 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of a contract zone with a known suggestion, they may be consistent with 
the predictions of a prior or ex ante contract zone, ∆ea, which can be derived in the case that bargainers have yet to 
receive the suggestion (but have a distributional expectation of what the suggestion would be).  In the ex ante case, 
Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) derive ∆ea for the naïve arbitrator case, and the size of ∆ea as a function of γ is U-
shaped.  If a smaller contract zone leads to higher dispute rates, then this implies the highest dispute rates at γ=.50, 
consistent with the present data.  If subjects have prior beliefs of ∆, then posterior estimates of the contract zone, 
∆post—calculated post-suggestion—may fail to accurately predict dispute rates if subjects are not perfect Bayesian 
updaters.  Data in Grether (1980) indicate that subjects overweight prior information in updating their beliefs.  18 
uncertainty effect altering the size of the contract zone through the parameter γ.  However, due to 
our modeling of the sophisticated arbitrator, if the suggestion is focal and causes final offers to 
converge, then this indirectly shrinks the contract zone due to the arbitrator placing a higher 
weight on the midpoint of the more convergent final offers.  This indirect effect of suggestions 
on the contract zone makes the comparison of CAsoph and CAsugg(0) a relatively strong test of 
the effectiveness of suggestions.  The marginal effect on CAsoph is significantly larger than the 
marginal effect on CAsugg(0) (Wald test, p=.06).  A nonbinding suggestion also lowers dispute 
rates in the NA treatment, although the effect here is not statistically significant.  In sum, our 
data provide evidence that suggestions prior to the use of a binding settlement procedure can 
significantly increase settlement rates, which is a key result of our paper.   
Our results also indicate that when suggestions are used, settlement rates are highest 
when the suggestion is either weighted little or much.  There is no significant difference in the 
coefficients on CAsugg(0) and CAsugg(.80) (Wald test p=.27), but the significantly larger 
marginal effect on CAsugg(.50) indicates that subjects are more likely to dispute in this 
treatment compared to other CAsugg treatments.  While this is speculation, subjects may view 
CAsugg(.50) as the least risky of the CAsugg treatments because both the suggestion and the 
arbitrator settlement preference will be equally weighted in the final settlement decision (see also 
footnote 18).  Risk-averse subjects will dispute more when the risk of doing so is least.  In 
essence, risk is most diversified when bargainers can still anticipate two equally-weighted draws 
from the arbitration/suggestion distribution (versus unequally weighted draws).  Results not only 
show that dispute rates are highest in CAsugg(.50) (Table 1), but results on settlement timing 
(full results available on request) show that after one minute, the cumulative settlement 
frequency is lowest in CAsugg(.50) compared to all other CAsugg treatments.  This is roughly  19 
consistent with the notion that risk-averse bargainers want to avoid risk and choose to settle more 
quickly when a recommendation is weighted on one extreme or another.    
Finally, the Table 1 results also identify bargaining experience effects in Round and 
Dispute History.  Disputes are less likely the higher the round number, but more likely with each 
previous round of dispute history for the pair.  This result highlights the distinct effects of good 
versus bad history on dispute rates.  
5.2  Bargaining positions and Settlement Values 
The first two columns of Table 2 show the results of a model of buyer and seller final 
bargaining positions.  Final offers generated at impasse are a measure of theoretical final offers, 
but the experimental bargaining program does not collect “final offer” data when agreement 
occurs prior to the end of the round.  For this reason, we code the final bargaining position to 
equal the final offer, when given at the end of the round, or the agreement x-value in the event 
that the subjects do not reach the end of the round.   
Our theoretical model yields testable predictions in terms of the effects of a 
recommendation on final bargaining positions and settlement x-values.  We therefore estimate 
three models in Table 2:  Buyer and Seller final bargaining positions, and agreement x-value.  
For the model of agreement x-values, we restrict our attention to the subset of rounds in which a 
voluntary settlement occurred (N=1038), and we correct for sample selection for that model 
using the two-stage Heckit procedure.  
The independent variables in Table 2 are mostly similar to those in Table 1.  One 
important distinction is in the use of variables to identify the impact of the specific suggestion on 
final bargaining positions.  Past Mid-round and Suggestion Exists are dummy variables that 
equal one when bargainers make it past 90 seconds and receive a suggestion, respectively.   20 
Suggestion Value measures the effect of the specific suggestion on bargaining positions and 
settlement values, with a squared term included to allow for nonlinear effects.   
Another main result is that final bargaining positions and settlement (agreement) x-values 
are all positively related to suggestions.  The pattern of coefficient estimates indicate a 
relationship shown in Figure 1—for the range of suggestions in our experiments, the data lie on 
the upward sloping portion of the estimated quadratic relationship.   This result is consistent with 
our modeling of focal suggestions on bargaining positions.  The fact that focal suggestions alter 
the location of the contract zone generates the prediction that agreement x-values would be 
positively related to suggestions, as is estimated in Table 2. 
In the buyer and seller equations in Table 2, there is some evidence that final bargaining 
positions are more divergent in CAnaive and CAsoph than in the CAsugg treatments, due mainly 
to the buyer (Player A).
17  The coefficient on Suggestion Exists may appear to weaken this result 
because buyers significantly lower their final bargaining positions whenever a suggestion exists, 
but one must also consider the effects of the level of the suggestion.  When suggestions are used 
Figure 1 indicates a slight convergence trend for higher suggested X-values, although the trend is 
statistically insignificant.   
An alternative approach to evaluation of this result is to examine the variance of 
arbitrated outcomes in the CAsugg treatments.  This is appropriate because more convergent final 
bargaining positions imply a higher weight to be placed by the sophisticated arbitrator on the 
bargainers’ final positions, which would reduce the variability of the arbitrated settlements.  
                                                 
17 Given that we use data from all voluntary settlement rounds and disputed rounds, our coding of final bargaining 
positions in the voluntary settlement rounds necessarily implies convergent final bargaining positions, which may 
seem to bias our Table 2 results towards convergent final positions in CAsugg treatments due to their higher 
settlement rates.  The results are, however, unchanged if one considers only the subsample of data where the 
outcome is dispute.  21 
Even if negotiations fail, bargainers retain some control over the arbitrated settlement when the 
arbitrator considers the proximity of the final bargaining offers in making a final decision.  So, 
the Table 2 results may imply a larger variance of arbitration settlements when there is no 
suggestion.  Table 3 shows summary statistics on each arbitration treatment.  Except for 
CAsugg(.50), the arbitration settlement variance is lower in the CAsugg treatments.  This is an 
important secondary result, because a smaller variance of arbitrated settlements may be 
important for the procedure to be considered acceptable (see Farber, 1980).  In sum, because of 
the sophisticated arbitrator, not only do recommendations lower dispute rates (Table 1), but in 
most cases they also reduce the variance of arbitration settlements by drawing offers together 
(Tables 2 and 3).  Finally, the estimated coefficients on Round and Dispute History are consistent 
with the Table 1 results.  They indicate that round experience brings bargainers together, while 
dispute history does the opposite.  In fact, one round of bad history (i.e., dispute) offsets the 
positive effects of over two rounds of general bargaining experience as measured by Round. 
The Agreement x-value model in Table 2 also indicates that certain ADR treatments 
significantly increase settlement values.  The pattern of coefficients here is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the average buyer is more risk-averse than the average seller in our data.  
Subjects in our experiment responded to a hypothetical lottery question meant to elicit risk 
preferences.  However, we do not consider their responses an accurate enough measure of risk 
preferences to include the variable in our formal analysis—subjects exhibited some confusion 
over the presentation of the lottery question—but average responses do indicate a slightly more 
risk-averse average buyer than seller.  Buyers would then give away more to sellers in negotiated 
settlements when the ADR procedure is considered riskier, which may be the case with extreme 
weighted suggestions in the CAsugg treatments (see footnote 18).  The predicted settlement  22 
values shown in Figure 1 are closer to predicted seller final bargaining positions than buyer final 
bargaining positions, which is also consistent with sellers being less risk averse than buyers.  In 
short, these treatment effect results from the Agreement x-value model in Table 2 are suggestive 
of bargaining power differences in our data, but a more detailed analysis can only be conducted 
with an experimental design that generates better measures of risk preferences.    
6. Conclusion 
  Dispute resolution procedures are intended to improve voluntary settlement rates, and 
nonbinding procedures generally boast high settlement rates. However, it is unclear from field 
data whether nonbinding procedures generate higher settlement rates for comparable disputes 
because binding procedures are often reserved for the most difficult disputes.  A hybrid 
procedure might include a nonbinding procedure followed by a binding procedure if needed, and 
this paper has examined the effectiveness of implementing a nonbinding suggestion prior to 
binding dispute settlement.  Such a procedure reflects important characteristics of real world 
dispute resolution, such as the use of a nonbinding recommendation prior to an arbitrated labor 
contract settlement, the use of parental input prior to resolving a sibling dispute, or the use of 
court-annexed mediation prior to a legal dispute proceeding to trial.  
  Theoretically, we analyze a model of sophisticated arbitrator decision-making that 
identifies the effects of recommendations on the bargaining contract zone.  Our laboratory data 
support the testable hypotheses of our theoretical framework, and support the use of nonbinding 
ADR mechanisms that use recommendations.  Dispute rates are significantly lower when a 
recommendation stage is included prior to arbitration.  The most effective procedures at reducing 
dispute rates are those that weight recommendations by a lot or a little in determining final 
binding voluntary settlement outcomes are positively related to suggestions.  We do not further  23 
explore in this paper the mechanism by which recommendations may serve as focal points, but 
existing research has made progress in this area (see, for example, Janssen, 2001; Bacharach and 
Bernasconi, 1997; and Sugden, 1995). 
  Consistent with our theoretical analysis, final bargaining positions and voluntary 
settlement values are positively related to recommendations.  Because recommendations 
generally cause final bargaining positions to converge, bargainers also retain more control over 
the outcome of an arbitrated settlement under our theoretical framework, and in our empirical 
results.  This is likely an important additional consideration in improving the acceptability of 
binding settlement outcomes, because procedures that generate highly variable arbitrated 
outcomes are not likely to be considered acceptable by disputants (Farber, 1980).       
  The implications of this research are significant given the large sums of dollars in dispute 
is a variety of industries.  Improved dispute resolution procedures can more efficiently allocate 
these disputed amounts by increasing settlement rates, because voluntary settlements imply self-
determined outcomes by the bargainers.  There are also many informal settings in which 
nonbinding suggestions prior to mandated outcomes can lower dispute rates.  Long-term 
relationships are likely to be healthier when dispute rates are low among bargainers who 
repeatedly interact.  This research highlights the benefits that recommendations can have on 
improving bargaining outcomes, and these recommendations can be a simple amendment to any 
binding dispute resolution procedures.  24 
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TABLE 1 
Probit Model (MLE estimates) 
Dependent Variable=Dispute 
(marginal effects reported) 
 
Independent Variable  Marginal Effect (p-value) 
Constant -.351  (.00)*** 
NAsugg                   -.06 (.37) 
CAnaive .46  (.00)*** 
CAsoph .50  (.00)*** 
CAsugg(0) .41  (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.20) .42  (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.50) .50  (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.80) .35  (.00)*** 
Round -.03  (.00)*** 
Dispute History                     .07 (.00)***  
 
 
N=1500 
 
Model correctly predicts 
1160/1500 (77%) of outcomes 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively,  
for the two-tailed test. 
The covariance matrix is adjusted for data clustering by bargaining pair. 
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TABLE 2 
(OLS Estimates) 
                              
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Dependent Variable= 
Buyer Final 
Bargaining Position 
p-value in parenthesis
 
Dependent Variable= 
Seller Final 
Bargaining Position 
p-value in parenthesis
Dependent Variable= 
Agreement x-value 
p-value in parenthesis 
(corrected for sample 
selection 
Constant      456.79 (.00)***     421.00 (.00)***     449.78 (.00)*** 
Past Mid-round  -27.63 (.01)***  40.41 (.00)***  7.67 (.25) 
Suggestion exists  -30.84 (.09)*  -24.19 (.20)  -24.53 (.11) 
Suggestion value  -.046 (.12)  -.038 (.19)  -.038 (.00)*** 
Suggestion value-squared .00025 (.00)***  .00022 (.00)***  .00022 (.00)*** 
NAsugg  19.16 (.47)  30.75 (.20)    25. 87 (.07)* 
CAnaive       -57.09 (.00)***       51.20 (.01)***       17.64 (.30) 
CAsoph       -46.87 (.00)***       63.65 (.00)***      44.55 (.01)*** 
CAsugg(0)   4.03 (.88)       65.64 (.01)***   54.17 (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.20)   3.72 (.91)       59.57 (.04)**    44.86 (.02)** 
CAsugg(.50)   -42.33 (.13)       55.16 (.04)**  34.20 (.11) 
CAsugg(.80)    11.52 (.70)       68.95 (.02)**     54.60 (.00)*** 
Round           2.85 (.00)***       -1.76 (.04)**     -.97 (.41) 
Dispute History          -6.60 (.01)***       8.89 (.00)***     5.51 (.02)** 
Lambda  ---  ---   -43.16 (.12) 
   
N=1500 
Adjusted R
2=.11 
 
N=1500 
Adjusted R
2=.18 
 
N=1038 
Adjusted R
2=.05 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively,  
for the two-tailed test. 
The covariance matrices for the buyer and seller model are adjusting for data clustering by 
individual.  In the Agreement x-value model, a clustering adjustment is made on the first-stage 
probit selection equation. 
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Table 3 
Mean and variance of arbitrated outcomes by treatment 
  Average Dispute 
Rate 
Mean of arbitrated 
settlements 
Variance of arbitrated 
settlements 
CA Naïve 
(N=100) 0.40  504.41  3264.21 
CA Sophisticated 
(N=100) 0.50  498.68  2746.59 
CA sugg(0) 
(N=284) 0.36  494.93  2465.79 
CA sugg(20) 
(N=100) 0.42  500.95  1627.72 
CA sugg(50) 
(N=184) 0.43  481.53  3546.93 
CA sugg(80) 
(N=100) 0.37  495.88  1577.88 
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Figure 1:  Final bargaining positions
(predicted values based on baseline (NA) Table 2 results)
 